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The Needle and the Damage Done:
How Hoffman Plastics Promotes Sweatshops and Illegal Immigration
And What To Do About It
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Sweatshop labor is the dirty secret underlying much of the clothing that is

manufactured and purchased in the United States. While the onset of several scandals
involving celebrity clothing lines drew sweatshop labor into public scrutiny a few years
ago, few people realize that sweatshop labor is a daily fact of life within the domestic
garment industry.
Horrific abuses were brought to light when garment workers in El Monte,
California were discovered chained to their machines by employers who forced them to
work in abhorrent conditions. While few cases involve the egregious, slavery-like
situation found in El Monte, sweatshops continue to be an ongoing problem within the
garment industry in Los Angeles.
Developments within federal law will make it even more difficult to combat the
existence and proliferation of sweatshops. In a misguided effort to minimize illegal entry
into the United States, the Supreme Court has injected immigration law into statutory
schemes that previously protected both documented and undocumented workers from
sweatshop conditions and employer abuse. This recent jurisprudence, as exemplified by
the Hoffman Plastics1 decision, also will make it more difficult for workers to form
unions to fight egregious workplace conditions.
In issuing these decisions, the Supreme Court has flatly disregarded
Congressional history and statutory language indicating that employment law protections
apply to all workers in the United States. Moreover, the Court ironically has created
incentives that will encourage unscrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers

1

Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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because the employers know they can violate statutory rights of undocumented workers
with virtual impunity.
This paper will argue that Hoffman Plastics was wrongly decided. Perhaps more
importantly, however, this paper will argue that the Hoffman Plastics decision reveals a
more fundamental problem in American labor law, as embodied in the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). Specifically, because the Act was designed to
compensate wronged employees but not to punish employers guilty of labor law
violations, the Act lacks the “teeth” necessary to deter employer misconduct.
This paper recommends that the Act be amended both to clarify the scope of its
protections and to ensure that sufficient remedies exist to punish wrongdoers and deter
violations. Part II provides a factual background describing the garment industry as an
example of the employment conditions in which undocumented aliens work. It explains
how the garment industry relies upon the exploitation of undocumented workers and
extensive labor code violations to ensure maximum profit for manufacturers and retailers.
Part III provides a description of pertinent statutory schemes governing labor and
immigration in the United States, focusing upon the Immigration Reform and Control
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. It also analyzes
recent federal case law and explains how these decisions have undermined both labor and
immigration policies.
Part IV explains why Hoffman Plastics was wrongly decided. It examines the
likely impact of Hoffman Plastics on both employment conditions and illegal
immigration. It concludes by arguing that the NLRA must be amended to provide
sufficient remedies in order to serve both immigration and employment policy goals. It
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also outlines additional steps that will better enable effective prosecution of unscrupulous
employers.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND – SWEATSHOPS, RAMPANT
LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS, AND UNIONIZATION
A.

Undocumented Workers in California

Illegal immigration is a fact of life in California. Every year, thousands of
immigrants cross the border and enter the United States without permission. As of
January, 2000, over seven million undocumented immigrants were living in the United
States;2 approximately forty percent live in California.3
Congress has attempted to deter illegal immigration by enacting immigration laws
that seek to limit and deter the entry of immigrants. Yet, because immigration is shaped
by economic forces beyond the government’s control, such laws have been largely
ineffective.
One of the primary reasons behind illegal immigration is the disparity of wealth
between the United States and countries south of its border. Life in the immigrant’s
country of origin may have been difficult, dangerous, or without economic opportunities.
Grinding poverty may motivate individuals to seek employment opportunities elsewhere.
As a result, Congress’s attempts to eliminate illegal immigration have, at best, reduced
the volume without eliminating the flow of immigrants entering without permission.4

2

See http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Ill_Report_1211.pdf
(last visited August 20, 2003).
3
See, e.g., http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/illegal.htm
4
See, e.g., Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286, 1439-40 (April, 1983).
4

Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops

As many unauthorized immigrants flee poverty to enter the United States, it is no
surprise that they often hope to secure employment after entry.5 In fact, numerous
industries that depend upon their low-wage, low-skilled labor draw them here.6 Although
an exact determination is difficult, it is estimated that about 30.9 percent of the labor
force in Los Angeles lacks work authorization.7
Many undocumented immigrants find jobs in Los Angeles sweatshops, toiling for
the garment industry. In fact, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) suggests
that immigrants comprise over 85% of Los Angeles' garment workers.8

B.

Sweatshops

The word "sweatshop" was first used in the 19th century. The term originally
described a system by which middlemen "sweated" profit from workers, who were paid
minimal wages in exchange for long hours and unsanitary conditions.9

5

Some argue that the undocumented workforce in California creates an underground
economy, without which the California economy could not thrive. Undocumented
workers pick the food Californians eat, tend to gardens of California residents, bus their
dishes and cook their food in restaurants, wash their cars, care for their children, and
clean their houses. Moreover, undocumented workers perform these services for very
little money. Opponents of illegal immigration claim that undocumented workers take
jobs away from American citizens. Others, however, point out that no American citizen
would be willing to do these jobs, given the horrible conditions and low wages. Of
course, if a readily available, easily exploited undocumented workforce did not exist,
perhaps employers would be forced to pay higher wages and improve working conditions
so that American citizens would be willing to take these low-skilled jobs. This debate,
while interesting and important, is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that an
undocumented workforce exists, and until the dire economic circumstances in other parts
of the world improve, illegal immigration is likely to continue.
6
Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion And Membership: The Dual Identity Of The Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955, 990-92 (November,
1988/December, 1988).
7
NOTE: Piece by Piece: Garment Workers, Livable Wages, and Economic Development
in Los Angeles County, 7 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y 147, 156 (Fall, 2001).
8
Id.
9
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org/swatch/industry/
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Today, the United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) defines a
sweatshop as "an employer that violates more than one federal or state labor, industrial
homework, occupational safety and health, workers' compensation, or industry
registration law."10 Colloquially, the term sweatshop is often used to describe a
workplace where employees earn low wages, enjoy few or no benefits, suffer from unsafe
working conditions, and face unfair or arbitrary discipline.11

C.

The Garment Industry

Most garment factories in the United States qualify as sweatshops. According to
the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”), more than half of the 22,000 garment
factories in the United States violate minimum wage and overtime laws, and 75% of
these factories violate safety and health laws.12 The DOL conducted a survey in Southern
California and found that two-thirds of the garment factories inspected qualified as
sweatshops based upon their failure to comply with federal minimum wage and overtime
laws.13 Many factory owners had paid workers less than half the federal minimum
wage.14 In total, the sweatshops surveyed owed $900,000 in back wages to 1,400
workers.15

10

Id.
Id.
12
http://www.dol.gov/esa/media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm.
13
Id. Most domestic garment factories are located in Los Angeles, the city on which this
paper will focus. See Piece by Piece, supra note 7 at 149. Domestic sweatshops,
however, are not limited to California. In fact, sweatshops exist wherever the desperation
of a large undocumented immigrant community encourages the payment of sub-standard
wages. See Leo L. Lam, Designer Duty: Extending Liability To Manufacturers For
Violations Of Labor Standards In Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 623,
633-34 (December, 1992).
14
http://www.dol.gov/esa/media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm
15
Id. To conduct the study, the DOL investigated 67 garment shops that were randomly
chosen from a list of factories registered with the California Labor Commissioner. The
11
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Of course, workers face additional injustices in these factories that are not
reflected in the dollar amounts owed. For example, many sweatshop workers risk their
lives as they toil between 60 and 80 hours per week in factories with blocked fire exits,
poor lighting, and inadequate ventilation.16 Working conditions are often unsanitary, and
factories are crowded, hot, cramped, and filled with flammable materials and hazardous
wiring.17 Furthermore, workers are denied dignity as they endure constant surveillance
and arbitrary discipline.18 In order to maintain a submissive workforce, management will
verbally or physically abuse their employees and threaten to terminate workers or report
them to the INS if they complain.19
A shocking example of sweatshop exploitation was discovered in August 1995,
when over 70 immigrant garment workers were found working behind barbed wire and
under armed guard in El Monte, California.20 The garment workers had toiled up to
nineteen hours a day, seven days per week, for little or no pay.21 Workers had been held
against their will for up to seventeen years.22 As they were forced to sew clothes for

survey does not include inspections unregistered shops, in which even more egregious
violations likely occur. Id.
16
www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org – the garment industry
17
Lam, supra note 13 at 633-34; Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine:
Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 291, 297
(Winter, 2003).
18
Id.
19
www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org – the garment industry; Lora Jo Foo,
The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening
Worker Protective Legislation., 103 Yale L.J. 2179, 2182-86 (May 1994) .
20
First Amended Complaint, Bureerong v. Uvawas, No. 95-5958 (C.D. Cal., filed Oct.
25, 1995) (Collins, J.)(“Bureerong Complaint”). Patrick Lee & George White, INS Got
Tip on Sweatshop 3 Years Ago, L.A. Times, Aug. 4. 1995 at A1.
21
Bureerong Complaint supra note 20.
22
Id.
7
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famous retailers and manufacturers,23 they slaved in over-crowded, unsafe conditions.
Rats crawled over them as they ate, slept, worked, and lived in the factory, which was
surrounded by razor wire.24 They were required to purchase food and other daily
necessities from their employers, who charged them four to five times the market price.25
Because the workers could not make unmonitored phone calls or write uncensored
letters,26 no one outside the factory knew of their misery until one of the workers escaped
through an air duct.27
The El Monte case presents an extreme example of the horrors of sweatshop
abuse. A less egregious, perhaps more common example of a Los Angeles sweatshop is
described in a 2001 suit filed against the Apex factory, which manufactured clothing for
Bebe, Inc.28 Immigrant workers filed claims against Apex and Bebe for unpaid minimum
wage and overtime pay.29 The workers typically worked 10-12 hours a day, six days a
week. The manager of the factory admitted under oath that he routinely altered the piece

23

The clothes were sold by some of the biggest retail stores in America, including
Mervyn's, Miller's Outpost, Montgomery Ward, May Co., Nordstrom, Sears, and Target.
Notes from interviews with attorneys representing workers, on file with author. The law
firm for which I worked represented the workers as co-counsel with the Asian Pacific
American Legal Center.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
After the August raid, eight operators of the sweatshop were arrested and charged with
involuntary servitude, kidnapping, conspiracy, smuggling, and harboring of the workers.
In February 1996, they pled guilty to criminal charges of involuntary servitude and
conspiracy. Ultimately, the workers were victorious in their civil suit, and they received a
sizeable settlement worth several million dollars.
27
Patrick Lee & George White, INSGot Tip on Sweatshop 3 Years Ago , L.A. Times,
Aug. 4. 1995 at A1.
28
First Amended Complaint, Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., et al., No. CV 01-10950 (C.D.
Cal.) (Fees, J.)(hereinafter “Bebe Complaint”).
29
Id.
8
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sheets and time cards of the workers.30 These alterations resulted in the workers
receiving no overtime pay.31 In addition, the factory managers routinely harassed and
berated the workers.32 When some of the workers stood up to the managers, they were
terminated and blackballed from seeking further employment in the garment industry.33
It is no coincidence that many of the workers willing to toil under these horrible
conditions are immigrants who lack work authorization. In a 1988 GAO report, which
characterized the garment industry as a "sweatshop industry,” the government attributed
the proliferation of sweatshops, in part, to the utilization of a vulnerable and easilyexploited immigrant workforce.34 Because undocumented immigrants with limited skills
and language barriers find few appealing options, their desperation forces them to accept
low-paying, grueling, entry level jobs that documented workers would shun.
At the same time, factory operators often prefer to hire undocumented immigrants
because their vulnerability necessitates a tolerance for abuse that documented workers
would be unwilling to withstand.35 This abuse continues without repercussion in part
because many unauthorized garment workers decline to file claims against their
employers for fear of deportation.36 Employers exploit this fear, knowing that few if any
30

Deposition transcript of Edmund Chan, on file with the author.
Id.
32
Bebe Complaint, supra note 28.
33
Id..
34
Foo, supra note 19 at 2186. The GAO also indicated that lack of adequate enforcement
of labor laws and inadequate penalties for violations also enabled to perpetuation of
sweatshops. Id. These factors will be addressed later in this paper.
35
Id.
36
Their fear is certainly warranted. Upon their discovery, the El Monte workers were
hardly treated with compassion. Rather, they were rounded up and placed in federal
penitentiaries. Only exhaustive efforts from public interest attorneys and tremendous
public outcry prevented their deportation. Notes from interviews with attorneys, on file
with author.
31
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workers wouldreport labor code violations. As a result, employers can lower wages,
extend work hours, disregard health and safety regulations, and suppress unionizing
efforts with near impunity.

D.

How the Garment Industry Encourages the Existence of
Sweatshops

The structure of the garment industry encourages the creation and proliferation of
sweatshops. The industry is commonly described as a pyramid, with each level formed
by a different step of garment production. A retailer exists at the top of the pyramid.
Manufacturers, which design, sell, and supply clothes under their own labels to retailers
occupy the tier immediatelybelow.
Subcontractor factories occupy the next step of the pyramid. Most manufacturers
outsource actual production to such factories, where the garments are sewn, trimmed, and
pressed.37 The factories are often small and may not be tied to specific sites or facilities.
They may relocate often, sometimes re-opening in a new factory under a different name.
Manufacturers contract production to factories in order to shift various costs and
business risks to the factories and thereby maximize profits.38 For example, by
outsourcing production, manufacturers can decrease overhead because they do not need
to secure or maintain a factory or sewing machines. Further, they reduce labor costs
because they are not required to hire or fire seamstresses, based upon their particular
needs at any given moment.39 And, they can attempt to shield themselves from liability

37

Lung, supra note 17 at 300.
Id. at 300-01.
39
Piece by piece, supra note 7 at n.40
38

10

Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops

for labor code violations by claiming that they do not employ the garment workers who
sew and finish their products.40
Factory managers hire and supervise the garment workers thatsew and assemble
the garments according to the manufacturer’s specifications and timetable.41 Garment
workers are at the bottom of the pyramid: they are the most numerous, the least paid, and
the most badly treated. Their tasks are repetitive and physically exhausting, yet require
no job training or education. For these reasons, workers are considered fungible and may
be hired or fired based upon the vagaries of the industry.
Most garment workers are paid according to the piecework system. Rather than
an hourly wage, a pieceworker is paid for each garment he or she sews. As a result,
wages vary depending upon how fast a seamstress works. Subcontractors often require
seamstresses to complete work at home in order to avoid paying overtime wages required
by law.42
Needless to say, profits are not distributed equally throughout the pyramid. The
top layers of the pyramid enjoy the lion’s share of the profits, with profit share decreasing
each step down the pyramid. For example, a retailer typically enjoys a 100 percent
markup on each garment. Accordingly, for a garment that costs the consumer $100, the
retailer will earn $50, the manufacturer will earn $30, the contractor will earn $15, and

40

Developments in the joint employer doctrine, explained below, may eventually curtail
their ability to shield themselves from liability for labor code violations.
41
Lung, supra note 17. at 300.
42
Id.
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the remaining $5 will be divided among all factory workers who sewed, assembled,
finished, and pressed the garment.43
In Los Angeles, over 4000 subcontractors vie for contracts. 44 This creates
excessive competition between factories, which when combined with consolidation at the
top of the pyramid, grants manufacturers the buying power to dictate the terms of their
orders to factories.45 If a factory cannot complete an order at the manufacturer’s price, the
manufacturer will simply take the order to another factory that can meet its demands.46
Driven by such conditions, factories underbid their competitors and are willing to accept
whatever price the manufacturer dictates in order to secure contracts. If factories cannot
compete, they go out of business, and the manufacturer simply hires new factories to
replace them.47 To stay in business at the prices dictated by manufacturers, factory
managers must force employees to work longer hours at lower wages, denying them the
minimum wages and overtime payments required by law.48
Factory managers undoubtedly take comfort from the fact that they are unlikely to
be prosecuted for even flagrant violations of the law. Government inspections are
infrequent. For example, in California, there is only a twenty or twenty-five percent
chance that any garment shop will be subjected to random inspection.49
Private lawsuits are even less common. Many workers fear termination,
deportation, or unemployment and are thus hesitant to report workplace violations. The
43

Piece by piece, supra note 7 at 160.
Foo, supra note 179 at 2186.
45
Lung, supra note 17 at 300-01.
46
www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org
47
Foo, supra note 19 at 2187; Lam, supra note 13.
48
Id.
49
Id.
44
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few who are prosecuted may avoid paying fines by filing bankruptcy or temporarily
going out of business, only to reopen under new names and continue to abuse workers.50
Under these circumstances, some factories accept the resulting small risk of prosecution
as an acceptable cost of doing business.

E.

The Unfulfilled Promise of Unionization

For over one hundred years, unions have attempted to organize garment workers
in hope of improving their working conditions and wages. For example, in the early
1900s, the ILGWU, the leading union representing workers producing women's clothing,
organized a four-month strike to pressure the Triangle Shirt Company to increase wages
and decrease hours. The ILGWU was able to negotiate a compromise with over three
hundred manufacturers, thereby securing the power and influence of the union.51 Later,
the ILGWU, with assistance from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
("ACWA"), unionized over two-thirds of the garment industry and negotiated a forty-four
hour workweek and a fixed salary for workers.52
More recently, in 1976, the ACWA merged with the Textile Workers Union of
America to form the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("ACTWU").
The ACTWU merged with the ILGWU in 1995 to form the Union of Needletrades,

50

In fact, the average life span of a garment factory is only thirteen months. Id.
Holly R. Winefsky and Julie A. Tenney, Preserving The Garment Industry Proviso:
Protecting Acceptable Working Conditions Within The Apparel And Accessories
Industries, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 587, 604 (Winter, 2000).
52
Id. at 604-05
51
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Industrial and Textile Employees ("UNITE").53 UNITE currentlyrepresents over 250,000
garment workers in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 54
Despite such progress, most garment factories are non-union.55 In particular,
unions and advocacy groups that have tried to organize garment workers in Los Angeles
have met with limited success. As of 1998, less than ten percent of Los Angeles garment
workers were members of UNITE.56
Unionization is difficult in Los Angeles because factories frequently change
locations and remain dispersed throughout a large geographical area.57 In addition, the
large percentage of undocumented workers in Los Angeles complicates unionization.
Many such workers believe that the risks of attempting unionize outweigh the benefits or
likelihood of success.58 They may feel desperate to keep their jobs and reject any action
taken against their employer’s interests because it would increase the likelihood of their
termination.59 Due to their undocumented status, they may also fear deportation.60
Although unions once viewed immigrants to threaten job security for American
workers, organized labor has changed its view and treatment of undocumented workers.

53

Id.; Laura Ho, Catherine Powell, and Leti Volpp, (Dis)Assembling Rights Of Women
Workers Along The Global Assembly Line: Human Rights And The Garment Industry, 31
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 383 (Summer, 1996).
54
Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51; Ho, Powell, and Volpp, supra note 53.
55
Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51 at 637.
56
Piece by piece, supra note 7 at 166.
57
Id.
58
Bosniak, supra note 6 at 993-97.
59
Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51 at 637-40.
60
Id.
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Most unions now advocate unity among workers, regardless of immigration status.61
Some unions have even prioritized the recruitment of undocumented workers and have
hired immigrant and bilingual organizers, printed materials in the workers’ native
languages, and sponsored classes on citizenship and immigrants' rights.62

III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Undocumented workers occupy a unique position at the juncture of immigration
law and labor law. As explained by Professor Linda Bosniak, on the one hand, they are
not legally authorized to be present and working in the United States. On the other hand,
they are protected by American labor laws and have the same rights as other workers to
bargain collectively, earn minimum wage and overtime pay, and enjoy safe working
conditions.63
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this tension in a way that prioritizes
immigration concerns over labor law issues. Although the Court maintains that
undocumented workers are employees with specific rights, they have denied them the
remedies that make such rights meaningful. In so doing, they paint undocumented
workers with the brush of illegality, nullifying legal protections due to the workers’ own
prior illegal conduct in crossing the border and working without permission. Yet in
61

Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 345, 399 (Summer,
2001).
62
Bosniak, supra note 6 at 995. Some unions have even taken special steps to protect
workers from deportation. For example, some unions have introduced "INS clauses,"
into collective bargaining agreements that require employers to notify the union if the
INS arrives at a factory so that the union can protect its members. Some contracts require
employers, "to the extent permitted by law," to deny INS agents access to the factory or
to worker employment records. Some contracts even require employers to reinstate
employees who miss work to attend an INS proceeding and authorize unions to provide
legal assistance in advance of an INS raid. Id.
63
Id.
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denying remedies and eviscerating statutory protections for undocumented workers, the
court has undermined employment conditions for all workers.
The next section provides a brief description of select immigration and labor laws.

A.

Relevant Statutory Schemes
1.

Employment Law
a. The NLRA

Congress created the NLRA64 in 1935 to curb unfair labor practices, protect
workers’ rights of association, and support organized unionization and the collective
bargaining process.65 The NLRA applies to “any employee” in the United States.66 It is
well-settled that under this broad statutory definition, undocumented workers are
protected by the NLRA.67
The NLRA authorized the creation of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”) to enforce orders against practices that violated the NLRA. While
the NLRB may exercise broad discretion in creating and enforcing remedies, it is

64

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
29 U.S.C. § 157; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-85 (1941).
66
29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The full definition is as follows: “The term ''employee'' shall
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.”
67
See, e.g., Sure-Tan at 891-92.
65

16

Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops

specifically authorized to require reinstatement with backpay and to issue cease and
desist orders. Each of these remedies will be briefly addressed in turn below.
Reinstatement occurs when a striking or terminated employee is allowed to return
to work. Reinstatement is not an absolute right. Rather, the NLRB has the authority to
assess, on a case by case basis, whether reinstatement is appropriate. Generally,
reinstatement is not appropriate when termination or refusal to hire was “for cause.”
Along these lines, the NLRB may deny reinstatement to an employee who engaged in
illegal activity prior to or in connection with his or her unlawful termination.68 For
example, the Board may decline to award reinstatement to an employee who illegally
entered or gained employment in the United States. The NLRB may require that an
employee prove that he or she is legally entitled to work in the United States prior to
reinstatement.69
An award of backpay often accompanies reinstatement.70 Backpay represents
wages for hours not worked due to an illegal termination. Calculation of backpay is
generally based on the wages that the employeewould have earned from the time of the
illegal termination until either reinstatement or the securing of alternate employment.71
The NLRB may also issue a “cease and desist” order, which requires an employer to stop
unlawful conduct or face contempt charges.

68

29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil , 134 F.3d at 57.
70
See, e.g, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
71
APRA Fuel Oil, 134 F.3d at 57.
69
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b. The FLSA
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)72 in 1938 to eliminate
“labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”73 The FLSA
dictates minimum wages, minimum age for employment, health and safety standards, and
overtime requirements.74 The FLSA applies to all employees, including undocumented
workers.75
Employees may file claims against employers who violate provisions of the FLSA
to recover unpaid wages, backpay, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s
fees and costs.76 Employers who violate the FLSA may also face criminal penalties.77
In addition to protecting employees, the FLSA aims to protect law-abiding,
reputable employers who, prior to the FLSA, operated at a competitive disadvantage with
sweatshops. In fact, the FLSA defines substandard labor conditions to constitute "an
unfair method of competition in commerce."78

B.

Immigration Law

It is well-established that the United States has the authority to forbid aliens from
crossing its borders. Although no constitutional provision expressly grants Congress the
power to exclude aliens from the United States, federal courts have recognized the

72

29 USC §§ 201-219.
Id. at § 202(a).
74
Id. at §§ 201-19.
75
See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir, 1988); Contreras, 25
F. Supp 2d at 1059-60.
76
See §§ 126(a), (b)
77
Id. at § 216(a).
78
See Bosniak, supra note 6 at 1003-04.
73
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implicit existence of such authority as part of Congress’s plenary power to control its
borders.79
For over one hundred years, Congress has limited immigration into the United
States by authorizing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to deny aliens
permission to enter into the United States and to deport those who have entered the
country without permission.80 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)81 addresses
the terms and conditions of admission into the United States.82 The INA prohibits
unauthorized entry and penalizes aliens who enter the United States without permission.83
Initially, the INA did not address employment or include any provisions
governing the legalityor treatment of undocumented workers. This approach shifted
when certain members of Congress decided that the best way to deter illegal entry was to
eliminate the ability of unauthorized immigrantsto seek employment after crossing the
border. They believed that sanctioning employers who hired undocumented aliens would
reduce the number of jobs available to them, thereby eliminating the incentive for illegal
entry.84
Thus, in an effort to further curtail the illegal entry and subsequent employment of
unauthorized aliens, in 1986 Congress passed sweeping legislation known as the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), which was incorporated as amendments

79

Bosniak, supra note 6 at 967-68.
8 USC §§ 1225-27 (1994). This power is now exercised by the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services.
81
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
82
See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
83
Bosniak, supra note 6 at 987
84
Bosniak, supra note 6 at 956-57.
80
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into the INA.85 Although the IRCA allowed undocumented immigrants who had resided
continuously in the country since 1982 to normalize their status through an amnesty
program,86 a comprehensive scheme of employer sanctions comprises the bulk of the
IRCA.
For the first time in American history, Congress attempted to deter the
employment of undocumented workers by punishing those who hire them.87 The IRCA
requires employers to seek verification of immigration or naturalization status prior to
hiring employees. It also requires employers to keep records of workers' immigration
status, and it imposes fines on employers who knowingly hire or recruit undocumented
workers.88 An employer who demonstrates a pattern and practice of hiring
undocumented workers can be sentenced to a six-month prison term. The law also
creates criminal penalties for immigrants who work without authorization, and it requires
employers to terminate employees upon learning of their undocumented status. 89
In making it illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers, Congress linked
immigration law to the workplace and authorized – in fact, required -- employers to
police the workplace for unauthorized aliens. Despite such provisions, Congress did not
amend labor laws to diminish their scope or exclude undocumented workers from their
protections. 90 In fact, even a cursory consideration of Congressional history reveals the
opposite: Congress did not intend for the IRCA to limit employment laws or remedies in
85
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The inclusion of legalization provisions represented a political compromise after
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any way. Instead, Congress remained determined to preserve protections and remedies
for allworkers , regardless of status, to ensure that no incentive existed to prefer
undocumented workers.91 This dual purpose highlights the tension between the
Congressional goal of supporting broad labor rights with the perceived need to restrict
immigration.92
For a variety of reasons, the IRCA has not succeeded in deterring the employment
of undocumented workers.93 Professor Linda Bosniak has presented a compelling
argument showing that at its core, the IRCA was ill-conceived and represents a grave
misunderstanding and underestimation of the circumstances which drive immigrants to
seek illegal employment in the first place. As noted by Professor Bosniak, among others,
the IRCA fails to account for the social, economic and political conditions that ensure a
constant flow of undocumented workers into this country.94
Moreover, in addition to failing to deter illegal immigration, the IRCA does not
sufficiently deter employer misconduct because the standard for liability is too high. As
a result, wrongdoers are rarely held accountable. Employers are only sanctioned if they
knew their employee lacked authorization. Good faith compliance with the verification
process supplies an affirmative defense that eviscerates any liability. An employer must
only show the documents supplied by a prospective employee were “reasonable on their
face” in order to avoid liability.95 Employers know that they can hire workers presenting
91
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at 2183.
94
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fraudulent documentation and avoid sanctions by claiming that they held a good faith
belief in the documents’ authenticity. 96
Sanctions are imposed far too infrequently to deter violations. The funding for
federal agencies responsible for enforcing the IRCA97 has been inadequate and poorly
allocated.98 Employers know that enforcement of the IRCA is sporadic at best, and the
prospect of any penalty must be discounted by the likelihood of actually being caught and
prosecuted.
For these reasons, statutory penalties are simply insufficient when compared with
the benefits of hiring undocumented workers. Some employers prefer to hire
undocumented workers because their rights need not be respected. Undocumented
workers are increasingly vulnerable as they are subject to criminal penalties and
deportation. As a result, the need to remain under the radar deters undocumented
workers from complaining about their working conditions or demanding that employers
respect their rights. Moreover, reliance on undocumented workers, who can be easily
exploited, gives unscrupulous employers a competitive advantage. For these reasons,
unscrupulous employers are often willing to pay fines as part of the costs of doing
business. 99
Ironically, by criminalizing the employment of unauthorized immigrants, the
IRCA has made their employment more desirable. As a result, wage levels and working
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Foo, supra note 19.
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conditions within the garment industry have diminshed as workers become more
vulnerable to employer abuse.100
The next section will explain how recent case law nullifies statutory labor rights
for undocumented workers by depriving them of remedies for legal violations.

C.

Pertinent Case law

Recent decisions have injected the IRCA into labor law adjudication. In
recognizing that undocumented workers are “employees” under labor law statutes, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that labor laws were intended to protect undocumented
workers. Yet in denying remedies to undocumented workers, the Court has nullified any
protection Congress offered them. These decisions ultimately will undermine labor
conditions for all workers, regardless of their immigration status.
The next section will assess recent federal cases, starting with the 1984 Supreme
Court decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,101 to reveal how the Court’s decision to
prioritize immigration law over labor law undermines the policy goals of the IRCA, the
NLRA, and the FLSA.
1.

Sure-Tan

In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB¸ thus beginning the
Court’s pattern of curtailing employment rights in an attempt to serve immigration
goals.102 Sure-Tan had violated the NLRA by asking the INS to investigate workers’
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David Bacon, The Political Economy Of Undocumented Immigration In The U.S.,
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immigration statuses after they had voted in favor unionization.103 Upon discovering that
the employees had entered the United States illegally, the INS apprehended them and
immediately placed them on a bus bound for Mexico.104
The union filed a claim with the NLRB, indicatingthatSure -Tan had violated the
NLRA by reporting the employees to the INS solely because they supported
unionization.105 The NLRB resolved the claim in favor of the union and issued an order
requiring reinstatement. It also ordered Sure-Tan to cease and desist violating the
NLRA.106 The Board deferred determination of backpay for a subsequent compliance
hearing.107
Sure-Tan appealed the order to the Seventh Circuit, which modified the NLRB
order.108 Noting that the former employees were already in Mexico, the Seventh Circuit
required reinstatement “only if the discriminatees [were] legally present and legally free
to be employed in this country when they offer[ed] themselves for reinstatement.”109 The
court further stated thatbecause backpay awards traditionally were tolled for any period
during which the employee was unavailable for work, the employees would be denied
backpay for any period during which they were not lawfully present and entitled to work
in the United States.110 Noting that tolling could eviscerate any backpay award or
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remedy, however, the court adopted a conjectural, six-month period, based upon which it
awarded backpay.111
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that undocumented workers qualify
as employees and were therefore protected by the NLRA.112 It also recognized that
extending NLRA coverage to undocumented workers was consistent with the Act’s goal
of protecting the collective-bargaining process.113 The Court reasoned that because the
INA evidenced only a peripheral concern with the employment of undocumented
workers, applying the NLRA to undocumented workers would not conflict with the
INA.114 In complete contrast to its later analysis in Hoffman Plastics, the Court
acknowledged that applying the NLRA to undocumented workers would serve
immigration policy bydiminish ing any incentive to hire them, thereby reducing the pull
for aliens to enter the country illegally in search of employment.115
Nonetheless, while the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the receipt of
backpay and reinstatement must be conditioned upon the immigrants’ lawful re-entry, it
flatly rejected the adoption of a conjectural six-month period because it was not narrowly
tailored to the “actual, compensable injury suffered by the discharged employees.”116
The Court acknowledged that its ruling could nullify the remedies available under the
NLRA, but it stated that a solution must be sought in Congress rather than in the
courts.117 In sum, the Courtin Sure-Tan recognized important immigration and labor
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policy reasons for protecting undocumented workers under the NLRA. At the same time,
it declined to award backpay or reinstatement to workers who had been deported because
doing so would have encouraged illegal re-entry into the United States.
Notably, the IRCA did not exist at the time the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan.
Instead, the Court interpreted the INA, a statutory scheme thataddressed the terms and
conditions under which immigrants could enter the United States, but thatdid not
separately address whether or not immigrants without documents could seek
employment.118 Subsequent decisions by the lower courts reveal that Sure-Tan did not
provide much clarity regarding what remedies were available to undocumented workers,
particularly after the passage of the IRCA.

2.

Post Sure-Tan Confusion
a. Pre-IRCA: Felbro

Two years after Sure-Tan and several years before the passage of the IRCA, the
Ninth Circuit decided Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB
(Felbro).119 The circuit court interpreted Sure-Tan’s denial of remedies to turn on
whether the worker had already left the country, thereby requiring illegal re-entry to
receive backpay. It held that because the employee in the case before them had not yet
left the United States, he was entitled to receive backpay, despite his undocumented
status. The court emphasized that a denial of backpay for employees who had not
departed the country was inconsistent with the NLRA
. It further noted that nothing in
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Sure-Tan indicated that the Court was overruling a well-established line of precedent
disregarding an employee’s legal status in awarding backpay.120
b. Post - IRCA Divergence
Despite intervening passage of the IRCA, in 1997, the Second Circuit adopted a
similar approach in NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.121 An employer
knowingly hired undocumented workers, but it terminated them in violation of the NLRA
after they signed union authorization cards.122 The NLRB awarded backpay and ordered
the employer to reinstate the employees, provided the employees could demonstrate legal
authorization to work.123
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the Board’s order, emphasizing that the
most effective way to further the immigration policies of the IRCA was to provide the
protections and remedies of the NLRA to both documented and undocumented
workers.124 Otherwise, the court noted, unscrupulous employers would have an incentive
to “play the provisions of the NLRA and IRCA against each other to defeat the
fundamental objectives of each, while profiting from their own wrongdoing with relative
impunity.”125 The court distinguished Sure-Tan by noting that the employees at issue had
not left the country prior to the award.126
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In Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., v. NLRB,127 however, the Seventh Circuit adopted a
completely different approach, interpreting Sure-Tan to preclude backpay for any period
during which an employee lacked work authorization. Del Rey Tortilleria had terminated
two employees for exercising their union rights. The union filed a claim with the NLRB,
and the Board awarded backpay and ordered reinstatement. 128
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee who lacked work
authorization was unavailable for work and therefore not entitled to backpay.129 It further
stated that an undocumented worker could not be cognizably harmed by termination
unlessthe employee was legally entitled to work in the United States.130

3.

Hoffman Plastics

In Hoffman Plastics, the Supreme Court clarified that undocumented workers
were not entitled to backpay after being terminated in violation of the NLRA. In so
doing, the Courtadopted a line of reasoning that directly conflicte d with the articulated
policy reasons underlying its decision in Sure-Tan.
Hoffman Plastics hired Jose Castro to work at its factory after reviewing
fraudulent documents indicating that Castro was lawfully entitledto work in the United
States.131 It terminated Castro several months later because of his involvement in a union
organizing campaign.132 Castro filed a claim against Hoffman Plastics with theNLRB .
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Unaware that Castro lacked work authorization, the NLRB ordered Hoffman Plastics to
reinstate Castro and award him backpay.133
At a subsequent compliance hearing before an administrative judge, Castro
admitted that he had supplied a friend’s birth certificate in order to secure employment
and that he was not authorized to be present or to work in the United States.134 Based on
these admissions, the ALJ denied Castro reinstatement and backpay.135
On appeal, the NLRB reversed the ALJ’s decision and awarded Castro backpay
from the time of illegal termination until the time when Hoffman Plastics learned of his
undocumented status.136 The NLRB emphasized that the most effective way to further
the immigration policies embodied in the IRCA was not to differentiate between
documented and undocumented workers in providing remedies for NLRA violations.137
Hoffman Plastics filed a petition for review with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Circuit of Columbia, but both the original panel and a subsequent en banc
panel rejected Hoffman Plastic’s argument that undocumented workers were prohibited
from receiving backpay, regardless of whether they had left the country after
termination.138
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a 5-4 decision, Judge Rehnquist
authored an Opinion reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision and holding that the IRCA
precluded awarding backpay to an undocumented alien. In finding that undocumented
workers could not recover backpay, regardless of whether they had left the country, the
133
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Supreme Court extended the holding of Sure-Tan and effectively overruled less
expansive interpretations of the IRCA as exemplified by the Felbro and A.P.R.A.
decisions.
The Court noted that when it decided Sure-Tan, immigration law had expressed
only a “peripheral concern” with the employment of undocumented workersand did not
criminalize employment after illegal entry.139 The IRCA altered the statutory landscape
by explicitly prohibiting the employment of undocumented workers, requiring employers
to discharge workers upon discovery of their undocumented status, and enacting criminal
penalties for those who relied upon fraudulent documents to gain employment.140
The Court noted that it had consistently set aside attempts to award reinstatement
or backpay to employees “found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their
employment.”141 The Court stated that allowing the NLRB to award backpay to illegal
aliens would trivialize immigration violations and undermine federal immigration policy.
Further, any mitigation of damages would require Castro to further violate the IRCA by
seeking illegal employment.142 Therefore, the Court concluded that the NLRB lacked the
authority to award the remedy of backpay.143 The Court added that the NLRB was not
without remedies, as it could still issue a cease and desist order under which Hoffman
Plastics could be cited for contempt for failure to comply.144
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. He countered that that all relevant federal agencies,
139
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including the Department of Justice, had indicated thataward ing backpay to an
undocumented worker would not undermine immigration policy. Justice Breyer
emphasized that the Court’s opinion would allow unscrupulous employers to violate the
NLRA at least once with impunity.145 Moreover, Justice Breyer noted that the Court’s
ruling would do little to deter illegal immigration, and that perversely, it could encourage
employers to hire undocumented workers.146

IV.

WHY HOFFMAN PLASTICS IS WRONG, WHAT IT WILL
CHANGE, HOW IT CAN BE FIXED
A.

Why Hoffman Plastics Was Wrongly-Decided

Regardless of how one feels about the unauthorized entry of aliens, the decision in
Hoffman Plastics is problematic because it is likely to undermine the policies it professes
to support. As explained at length below, Hoffman Plastics will encourage unscrupulous
employers to hire undocumented workers, thereby creating more opportunities and
encouraging further illegal immigration.
This perverse result would perhaps be less troubling if the opinion in Hoffman
Plastics was dictated by relevant statutes, congressional history, or Supreme Court
precedent. Yet, the outcome in Hoffman Plastics was not pre-ordained, and the reasoning
utilized by the majority is by no means self-evident. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, hardly the
most liberal court in the nation, came to exactly the opposite holding.
The Court’s decision is somewhat logical, if overly technical and divorced from
contextual realities. If an employee is not authorized to work in the United States, he or
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she technically cannot be considered available for work. If he or she technically is not
available for work, then he or she cannot receive backpay.
Nonetheless, in applying the above reasoning, the Court unnecessarily injected the
goals of immigration law into a statutory scheme designed to remedy labor code
violations. Although the Court emphasized that the NLRB could not enforce the NLRA
to the IRCA’s detriment, it authorized the converse. The NLRB is now required by the
Court to enforce immigration law – which it clearly is not qualified or statutorily
authorized to do.
This decision to favor the IRCA over the NLRA was not supported by general
principles of statutory construction or interpretation. The Court essentially inferred a
decision by Congress to amend the NLRA to preclude the award of remedies to
undocumented workers. Although a tension in federal policies exists insofar as Congress
seeks to both protect worker rights and deter the employment of undocumented workers,
nothing in the IRCA implicitly or explicitly amended or repealed the NLRA or any other
labor law.147 Under basic principles of statutory interpretation, amendments by
implication are disfavored. Only when Congressional intent is clear should a later act
amend or repeal provisions of an earlier act.148
Moreover, Congressional history reveals that in passing the IRCA and making the
employment of undocumented workers illegal, Congress specifically intended not to limit
the NLRA. Instead, Congress emphasized that the continued protection of undocumented
workers under the NLRA was fully consistent with the goals of the IRCA. It also
recognized that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents would be
147
148
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adversely affected if undocumented workers provided job competition but were not
subject to the same terms of employment.149
Furthermore, the House Judiciary Committee Report provided:
[N[o provision of the IRCA should be used to undermine or diminish in any way
labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor
relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair
practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights
before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing law. In
particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intended to limit in any way the
scope for the term “employee” in Section2(3) of the NLRA, as amended, or the rights
and protections [therein].150
And, the House Education and Labor Committee Report had stated that no provision
of the IRCA should limit the powers of state or federal labor standards agencies, such as
the NLRB, to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented workers, because
to do so would undermine efforts to limit the hiring of undocumented employees.151
Based upon the above, the NLRB’s decision to award backpay reconciled the
goals of employment and immigration law in a way that complied with Congressional
intent and statutory language. Because its reconciliation of competing statutory schemes
was reasonable, the NLRB’s decision to award backpay was entitled to deference and
should have been affirmed.152
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B.

What Hoffman Plastics Will -- and Will Not -- Change
1.

The One Free Pass Problem

Just like the IRCA that it aims to support, Hoffman Plastics is unlikely to deter or
even affect illegal immigration.153 Individualsfleeing desperate economic conditions in
their countries of origin are not likely to factor American employment laws into their
decision to migrate. Nor are they are likely to ponder the consequences of illegal
termination should they attempt to unionize prior to seeking employment.
Along these lines, labor laws do not create incentives– rather, it is the jobs
themselves that encourage illegal immigration.154 Hoffman Plastics will do nothing to
diminish employment opportunities for undocumented workers. In fact, the opposite is
true: unscrupulous employers who do not wish to comply with labor laws have an
incentive to hire undocumented workers. They can employ undocumented workers,
violate their rights, and terminate them – or report them to the INS in retaliation155 – if
they complain or seek to unionize.
Although this is illegal, an undocumented worker has no remedy should it occur.
Removing the ability to award reinstatement or backpay leaves the NLRB with almost
nothing in its remedial arsenal where undocumented workers are concerned. The only
remaining remedy is the issuance of a cease and desist order. Under a cease and desist
order, an employer is ordered not to violate certain statutory provisions. If the employer
153
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violates the order, he or she is subject to sanctions and contempt. As such, a cease and
desist order is forward-looking; it does not address or remedy past violations.
In practice, this will amount to “one free pass.” Employers can violate the labor
law where undocumented workers are concerned until the Board rules against them and
issues a cease and desist order. Upon that ruling, therestill will be no meaningful
sanctions issued. Instead, the Board will simply instruct the employer not to violate the
law in the future or face contempt, assuming anyone bothers to report subsequent
violations to the court.
The one free pass problem is particularly troubling in the context of the garment
industry, where factories close and re-open under new names with frequency.
Unscrupulous factory owners could simply close upon the issuance of a cease and desist
order, terminate all workers, and re-open under a new name in a new facility with no
cease and desist order hanging over its head. Theoretically, this cycle could continue
indefinitely, particularly given the unlikelihood that any employer will be prosecuted for
labor code violations in the first place.
Furthermore, in nullifying remedies, the Court has undermined any incentive on
the part of undocumented workers to report NLRA violations in the first place. A
credible fear of deportation or termination creates a formidable deterrent for
undocumented workers under any circumstances. When undocumented workers learn
that employers will face no consequences, it is even less likely that they will report
violations. The combined effect is that undocumented workers who attempt to unionize
or report violations face deportation, but their law-violating employers will get off with a
slap on the wrist.
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2.

Attempts to Unionize Will Be Undermined For
All Workers

Based on the above, Hoffman Plastics provides employers with a mechanism for
thwarting union organizing with mass firings and relative impunity. The decision, which
was purportedly aimed at making undocumented labor less common, will instead result in
increased exploitation as undocumented labor becomes less expensive to employ.
The detrimental effects of Hoffman Plastics will not be limited to undocumented
workers. Instead, the ruling effectively jeopardizes working conditions for legal
employees by encouraging the existence of an underground economy, in which
undocumented workers compete for jobs with documented workers. Documented
workers compete at a disadvantage because they are more expensive to employ, given
that they can unionize and their labor rights must be respected.
Furthermore, the legal distinction between documented and undocumented
workers will hinder attempts by workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining,
thereby threatening the rights of all workers. For unionization and collective bargaining
to be effective, employees must be able to band together to demand better working
conditions. Any action that divides and conquers by creating legal distinctions
undermines such efforts.
By deterring unionization of undocumented workers, Hoffman Plastics has eroded
unity and damaged workers’ ability to effectively organize.156 Any lack of participation
by undocumented workers in the collective bargaining process will have a negative effect
for all workers. Employers who do not want a unionized factory are more likely to hire
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undocumented workers, who are less likely to unionize. If undocumented employees do
attempt to unionize, employers can simply fire them, knowing that they will not be forced
to pay backpay or any other penalty.157
In the garment industry, attempts to quash unionization by hiring undocumented
workers are easily foreseeable. The subcontracting system already enables evasion of
unionization. Manufacturers generally contract with small, mobile, nonunion factories
that are difficult for union organizers to locate or monitor.158 Individual employees are
less likely to organize among themselves without outside union representatives, given
that they could lose their jobs without repercussions for the employer.
The absence of unionization will likely enable further deterioration of working
conditions in many factories, particularly in the garment industry, where skirting labor
codes may be a prerequisite to profitability. Unions have been effective in ensuring that
garment factories comply with basic labor codes.159 Without the help of unions, it will be
more difficult for factory workers to secure minimum wages, overtime, or safe working
conditions. 160
The absence of unions also will make it more difficult for undocumented workers
to report and prosecute labor code violations. There are many benefits to pursuing
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grievances through the union. Workers may participate in a grievance-arbitration
procedure at no cost. Union assistance helps the employee to overcome an unequal
balance of power, resources, and experience.161 Union members may be provided with
the assistance of a union representative or lawyer, who will conduct discovery on the
member’s behalf. Arbitration is relatively prompt and arbitrators enjoy broad discretion
in crafting appropriate remedies.162 This avenue is foreclosed to those who effectively
are unable to form or join unions for fear of termination without recourse.
3.

Expansion of Hoffman Plastics Could Further
Eviscerate Employment Protections

Provisions for backpay are included in the NLRA, the FLSA, and Title VII.
Even if the courts continue to recognize that undocumented workers are, by definition,
employees under protective employment statutes, Hoffman Plastics creates precedent for
denying undocumented workers the remedy of backpay that is traditionally available for
the violation of these statutes. Efforts to deny undocumented workers remedies for
various labor code violations have been occurring ever since Sun-Tan.163 Recently,
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defendants have once again attempted to expand Hoffman Plastics to areas unrelated to
the NLRA.164
Moreover, under Hoffman Plastics, a court could affirmatively require any
employee to prove his immigration status before he is entitled to reinstatement or
backpay. 165 Any employee who does not seek reinstatement and backpay in his or her
complaint will effectively admit that he or she lacks documentation. This Catch-22 could
further deter undocumented workers from pursuing claims against their employers for
NLRA, FLSA or Title VII violations.

C.

How It Can Be Fixed

The sections above have demonstrated that the intersection of labor and
employment laws have resulted in confusion due to seemingly inconsistent goals. On the
one hand, Congress aims to protect the rights of all workers, regardless of immigration
status. On the other hand, Congress seeks to deter the employment of undocumented
workers. The Supreme Court has attempted to reconcile these conflicting policy goals in
a way that leaves employment rights without remedies, and allows if not encourages
employers to violate the rights of undocumented workers with impunity.
The section above also explains how in Hoffman Plastics, the Court ignored
Congressional history to find that although undocumented workers are employees under
the NLRA, they nonetheless can be allowed no meaningful remedy should employers

remedy of backpay or reinstatement unless he could prove that he was authorized to work
in the United States at the time of the employer’s refusal to rehire him.
164
For example, in De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237 (2002),
defendants argued that they were entitled to discovery of documents relating to
plaintiffs’ immigration status because the plaintiffs had filed claims alleging that
defendants had violated Title VII and the FLSA.
165
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violate their rights. It may appear that a simple solution to this predicament could be
provided if Congress were to amend the NLRA to explicitly provide its protections to all
workers, regardless of immigration status. This would effectively overrule the result in
Hoffman Plastics.
Yet, although such an action would benefit employees, it ultimately would be
insufficient. A review of Hoffman Plastics ultimately begs the question of whether
backpay provides a sufficient penalty to any employee, regardless of documentation
status. The next section explains that even if undocumented workers were to receive
backpay, such a remedy still would be insufficient to deter employer wrongdoing,
particularly when employers have a lot to lose with unionization. As a result, more
extensive action by Congress is required in order to ensure that workers are protected
from labor code violations.
This paper recommends that Congress specifically amend the NLRA to include
employer penalties sufficient to deter violations of the Act. It further recommends steps
to ensure that wrongdoers are caught and prosecuted. Specifically, this paper suggests
that additional resources should be allocated to NLRA enforcement, and that
undocumented whistleblowers with valid claims should receive amnesty or deferred
action status. Alternatively, Congress should preclude from deportation hearings the
introduction of evidence gathered through labor law disputes. Such steps would
encourage undocumented workers to file complaints regarding employer wrongdoing by
removing the threat of consequential deportation.

40

Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops

1.

Congress Must Increase NLRA Penalties

The NLRA authorizes remedial orders but does not authorize the Board to
“punish” wrongdoers. This limitation leaves the Board with little enforcement authority,
regardless of whether the employee is authorized to work in the United States. The
situation is, of course, much worse when an undocumented worker’s rights have been
violated, given that he or she cannot receive backpay or reinstatement.
Yet, even an award of backpay does not sufficiently deter misconduct. An award
of backpay restores “the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have
obtained, but for the illegal discrimination.”166 The goal of backpay is to make the
employee whole, not to punish the employer.167 Employees are required to seek other
work while they pursue their claim, and any amount earned after illegal termination is
off-set against the amount an employer is obliged to pay. This mitigation requirement,
when combined with the unlikelihood of being caught and prosecuted, further
undermines any deterrence.168
Similarly, reinstatement is not an effective deterrent. Employees are required to
mitigate by seeking other employment; those who have successfully secured alternate
employment often are not interested in the remedy. Even those without alternate
employment may hesitate to return to a hostile employer that illegally fired them for fear
of further retaliation.169 In fact, NLRB statistics reveal that of 16,000 employees, less
than a quarter are reinstated. 170
166
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Finally, cease and desist orders simply tell the employer not to violate the law;
they do nothing to penalize the employer, even for egregious misconduct. Nor do they
deter misconduct due to the one free pass problem.
In short, there is every reason for shops seeking to avoid unionization to risk
NLRA penalties in order to disrupt a campaign’s momentum. By the time employees
terminated for favoring unionization are reinstated, organizing momentum is lost, and
unionization often has been defeated.171 Current remedies do nothing to dissuade
employers from terminating employees seeking to unionize, and paying the paltry
penalties under the Act – assuming they are ever prosecuted. Thus, while it is necessary
for undocumented workers to receive the same remedies as documented workers, current
remedies provided are simply insufficient to serve their intended purposes.
Although the purported goal of NLRA remedies is not the punishment of
employers, it is unclear why employers should not be penalized for illegal acts. The
current remedies under the NLRA do not sufficiently focus on the wrongdoing of the
employer. Any remedy should contain a level of penalty sufficient to deter employer
wrongdoing, even when the likelihood of prosecution is factored into the calculus.
Deterring wrongdoing in the first place will also prevent unscrupulous employers from
gaining an unfair advantage over law-abidingcompetitors .
Some unions have recognized the insufficiency of current remedies and have
proposed alternatives, particularly where undocumented workers are concerned. For
example, because a nominal backpay award has not sufficiently deterred unlawful
conduct, the ILGWU has proposed that damages be calculated based upon actual rather
171
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than legal availability. The ILGWU would shift the burden of immigration status to the
employer as an affirmative defense. If the employer raises immigration status, the
ILGWU recommends that the NLRB provide alternate remedies, such as backpay up to
the time when the employer establishes that the employeewould have been terminated
for nondiscriminatory reasons.172
This proposal is interesting, yet ultimately, it does not go far enough to deter
misconduct. It still relies upon backpay to provide the gauge of damages, which is
insufficient even when the worker can collect it. The proposal still allows the workers’
immigration statuses to remain relevant and subject to discovery. Furthermore, it is not
realistic to assess backpay based upon the likelihood of a legitimate termination; in
theory, a worker could collect backpay for the rest of his or her working life.
A better approach would create meaningful remedies where the workers’ status is
simply irrelevant. If Congress were to create additional, effective remedies sufficient to
punish employers found guilty of wrongdoing, the perceived IRCA problem presented by
reliance upon backpay – and the resulting inquiry into immigration status – could be
avoided. Employees harmed by an employer’s illegal, tortuous conduct would be entitled
to damages, regardless of immigration status.
In general, the theory underlying a claim provides guidance for what type of
remedy is available.173 If a claim is based upon a contract theory, a successful plaintiff
generally is entitled to compensatory and consequential damages. A plaintiff whose
claim sounds in tort law, however, often is entitled to significantly greater damages,
including punitive damages in certain cases. Wrongful termination claims generally
172
173
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sound in tort law. Notably, undocumented aliens are permitted to recover tort damages
for wrongful termination. 174
This paper suggests that the NLRB should be authorized to award statutory
damages similar to those allowed for violations of the FLSA. The FLSA authorizes
statutory damages of up to $10,000 per violation.175 It also allows a successful claimant
to recovery liquidated damages, as well as attorney fees and costs. There is no reason
why a claimant under the NLRA should not be eligible for similar damages.
This paper further recommends that the NLRA be amended to allow the award of
punitive damages. Given that undocumented aliens are entitled to sue for tort
damages,176 there is no policyreason why tort remedies couldn’t be effectively
incorporated into labor codes such as the NLRA. Such penalties would be more likely
sufficient to deter wrongdoing. Punitive damages would be particularly appropriate in
cases where the employer conduct is egregious, or where the employer is a chronic
violator. In the context of the garment industry, punitive damages could drive domestic
sweatshops out of business. This could reduce the number of unscrupulous
subcontractors willing to perpetuate sweatshop conditions. Reputable businesses would
no longer be forced to compete at a disadvantage. Manufacturers would be forced to
absorb the cost of legally compliant production.
Such a proposal assumes that the codes will actually be enforced. As it stands,
however, the likelihood that a sweatshop will be caught and prosecuted for labor code
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violations is relatively small. 177 The next section explores some measures that could
better ensure that wrongdoers will be caught and prosecuted, thereby resulting in
effective deterrence.

2.

Effective Deterrence Requires a Greater Likelihood
of Prosecution

There are at least two ways to ensure that wrongdoers are more likely brought to
justice. One way would be to increase government enforcement. Currently, sweatshop
operators know that there is very little chance that they will be caught or prosecuted. The
DOL is dramatically understaffed. Due to the dearth of investigators, there is only a
twenty percent chance that the DOL will catch a violator.178 Once the violator is caught,
the DOL rarely follows up to ensure that sweatshops comply with labor laws. This
failure results in repeat violations for at least one out of three violators. An obvious step
would be to increase resources to the DOL so that they can investigate and prosecute
sweatshops. Yet, due to politics and government budget cuts, this is unlikely to occur.179
A better approach would be to encourage workers to file private complaints
against sweatshop employers. Currently, although employees may sue their employers
directly, they rarely do so. Many employees do not know their rights. This is a
circumstance that education through unionization could improve. Yet, even employees
who know their rights may hesitate to file claims because they are afraid of losing their
jobs without recourse. Ensuring that labor codes provide remedies for all employees
would help solve this problem.
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Of course, undocumented workers risk deportation as well as termination in filing
lawsuits.180 Although in theory, employers are forbidden from reporting employees to
the INS in retaliation for exercising collective bargaining rights, this paper has already
described how the absence of effective remedies makes such protection meaningless,
particularly if the INS is able to act on unlawful tips.181 There is little to stop the INS
from introducing evidence in deportation proceedings obtained due to the employer’s
breach of the NLRA.182
Undocumented workers therefore need better protection. One approach could be
to protect discovery of immigration status, to the extent it remains relevant, with a court
order. Another option would be to provide amnesty or deferred action status to
whistleblowers. The INS could exercise its discretion to provide temporary work
authorization to undocumented workers who have filed credible claims of workplace
violations.183 Such steps would help law enforcement officials pursue actions against
sweatshops, since prosecutors would depend upon the testimony of the workers.184
Alternatively, as suggested by Professor Lori Nessel, Congress could adopt a rule
for deportation proceedings suppressing the use of evidence obtained through the
violation of the NLRA. This would be similar to the “fruit of the poison tree” exclusion
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relied on in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.185 The INS would be prohibited from
relying on information provided in violation of the NLRA or other labor codes.186

3.

Increase manufacturer liability

The above steps will increase the odds that employers who violate labor laws will
face appropriate consequences. Yet further reforms are needed to ensure that all who are
responsible for sweatshop conditions are held liable.
Manufacturers benefit from sweatshop labor, and as described above, they dictate
the prices that garment workers are paid for their labor. Manufacturers must be brought
within the fold of liability by recognizing that they truly are joint employers of the
workers who toil for them and create garments for their benefit and profit. They can no
longer be permitted to hide behind the fiction of a contractor relationship, thereby
relieving themselves of responsibility for the violations that they create.187

V.

CONCLUSION
As described above, the current law, as dictated by Hoffman Plastics, allows

employers to violate the NLRA with impunity when the rights of undocumented workers
are involved. In an effort to deter illegal immigration, the Supreme Court has deprived
the NLRB of remedies necessary to effectuate Congressional goals. At the same time,
the Court’s ruling will encourage unscrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers,
thereby undermining the policies that the Court intends to support.
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A better approach would make NLRA remedies independent from a worker’s
immigration status. This would ensure that both undocumented and documented workers
have a reason to report labor law violations. These remedies must be sufficient to punish
unscrupulous employers and deter future wrongdoing. As it stands, limitation of
remedies to backpay and possible reinstatement are insufficient. It is necessary to create
additional statutory remedies to punish wrongdoers.
At the same time, remedies are meaningless unless employers are actually
prosecuted for wrongdoing. Steps must be taken to ensure that workers report violations
and sweatshop operators are actually prosecuted. Providing amnesty or deferred action
status to undocumented immigrants who report violations will provide necessary measure
of protection so that whistleblowers are not deported in exchange for ensuring that our
labor codes are respected. In addition, the DOL must be sufficiently staffed to create a
likelihood of prosecution. Finally, it is necessary to hold manufacturers responsible as
joint employers so that they no longer create situations that require dependence on
sweatshop labor.
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